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INTRODUCTION
Pinnacle Homes, Inc. ("Pinnacle" hereafter) contracted with Platinum Builders, Inc.
("Platinum") to roof a house Pinnacle was building in Saratoga Springs, Utah. Platinum's
employee, Glen Ebmeyer actually performed the work. As he was finishing the project, he
fell from the roof and fractured his right wrist, elbow, and the heels of both feet. He then
sought workers' compensation benefits for his injuries.
The Utah Labor Commission's Administrative Law Judge and Appeals Board ruled
that Mr. Ebmeyer is entitled to workers' compensation benefits, and that both Platinum and
Pinnacle are liable for those benefits—Platinum as Mr. Ebmeyer's direct employer and
Pinnacle as his "statutory employer" pursuant to § 34A-2-103(7) of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
In proceedings before this Court, Pinnacle argues it is not liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's
benefits because it is not his statutory employer.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and § 34A-2-801(8).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did Pinnacle Homes Inc. satisfy § 34A-2-104(4)(b)'s requirements for

excluding corporate officers as "employees," so as to preclude Pinnacle from being
considered a "statutory employer" under § 34A-2-103(7)?
Standard of review: Pinnacle's argument is two-pronged. First, Pinnacle asserts as
fact that Pinnacle "provided written notice to its insurance agent" that it was excluding its
officers as employees. (Pinnacle's brief, page 12.) Second, Pinnacle challenges the Appeals
1

Board's application of § 104(4)(b) to the facts of this case. Specifically, Pinnacle contends "it
does not make sense" to require Pinnacle to comply with § 104(4)(b) by submitting written
notice of its intention to exclude corporate officers when those officers were Pinnacle's only
employees. (Pinnacle's brief, page 13.) Different standards of appellate review apply to each
prong of Pinnacle's argument.
A. Issues of fact. The objective actions that Pinnacle took to exclude its officers as
"employees" are questions of fact. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act ("UAPA") requires this Court to uphold the Appeals Board's findings of fact
if "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record." See Drake
v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah App. 1997).
B. Application of law. Pinnacle challenges the Appeals Board's application of §
104(4)(b)'s written notice requirement to the facts of this case. Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) of
UAPA authorizes Utah's appellate courts to grant relief from agency actions that erroneously
interpret or apply the law.

This review authority is exercised in conjunction with §

34A-1-103 of the Utah Labor Commission Act, which grants the Commission ". . . the duty
and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law
This Court has previously held that § 34A-1-103 is an explicit grant of discretion to the
Commission:
(T)he Industrial Commission (predecessor to the Labor Commission) has been
granted broad discretion to determine the facts and apply the law. (Citing
§35-1-16(1), now codified as 34A-1-103)
When the Commission "applies
the law," we review its determination for reasonableness.
Caporoz v. Industrial Commission, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah App. 1997); see also Osman
Home Improvement v. Industrial Commission, 948 P.2d 240,242 (Utah App. 1998). Thus, in
2

reviewing the Appeals Board's application of § 104(4) to the facts of this case, this Court will
uphold the Commission's decision unless it "exceed(s) the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality" so as to constitute an abuse of discretion under §63-46b-16(h)(i) of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act. Osman at 243.
Preservation of issue for review: Pinnacle raised the foregoing issues in proceedings
before the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for appellate review. (Record at 158.)
2. Did Pinnacle's relationship with Platinum satisfy § 103(7)'s "supervision or
control" test, thereby making Pinnacle Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer."
Standard of review: Whether Pinnacle retained supervision or control over Platinum within
the meaning of § 103(7) requires application of the statutory test to the facts of this case. As
already noted in this brief, § 34A-1-103 of the Utah Labor Commission Act grants the
Commission ". . . full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the
law in this or any other title or chapter it administers . . . ." The Appeals Board's
determination will be affirmed if found to be reasonable and rationale. Osman at 243.
Preservation of issue for review: Pinnacle raised the foregoing issues in proceedings
before the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for appellate review. (Record at 168.)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The determinative statutes are § 34A-2-103 and § 34A-2-104 of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act (Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.) These statutes are set forth
in Appendix A of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This case arises from Mr. Ebmeyer's claim for benefits under the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. Specifically, Pinnacle seeks appellate judicial review of
3

a determination by the Utah Labor Commission's Administrative Law Judge and Appeals
Board that Pinnacle is Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" under § 103(7) of the Act and
therefore liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's workers' compensation benefits.
Course of Proceedings: Mr. Ebmeyer filed an initial claim for workers' compensation
benefits against Platinum Builders on September 19, 2003. (Record at 1.) On June 22, 2004,
Mr. Ebmeyer amended his claim by adding Pinnacle as an additional respondent. (Record at
65.) Judge Sessions held a formal evidentiary hearing in this matter on August 30, 2004.
Platinum failed to appear for the hearing and was defaulted. Mr. Ebmeyer, Pinnacle and the
Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF")1 participated in the hearing. (Hearing transcript at 5.)
Judge Sessions then issued his decision awarding benefits to Mr. Ebmeyer and holding
Pinnacle and Platinum jointly and severally liable for those benefits. Judge Sessions found
Platinum liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's direct employer.

Pinnacle was held liable as Mr.

Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" under § 103(7) of the Act. (Appendix B; Record at 143-148.)
Pinnacle requested Appeals Board review of Judge Sessions' decision. (Record at
151-173.) On August 29, 2006, the Appeals Board affirmed Pinnacle's liability for Mr.
Ebmeyer's benefits. (Appendix C; Record at 217.)

Pinnacle then filed the petition for

judicial review that is now before this Court. (Record at 223.)
Statement of Facts: Pinnacle is a Utah corporation in the business of constructing and
then selling houses. (Hearing transcript at 87, 95.) Three individuals, Brad Liljenquist, James

1 The Uninsured Employers' Fund is created by § 34A-2-704 of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act for the purpose of paying workers' compensation benefits to the injured
employees of uninsured and insolvent employers. The UEF is funded by an assessment
against the workers' compensation premiums of all insured employers and the imputed
premiums of all self-insured employers in Utah.
4

McWhorter and Skip McWhorter, own the corporation and serve as its officers. (Transcript at
15, 75, 95.) These officers acquire building sites, hire contractors, handle financial matters
and perform other management duties. (Transcript at 80, 84, 87, 92, 98.) However, all
construction work on each house is performed entirely by contractors hired by Pinnacle.
(Transcript at 88, 89.) Pinnacle sometimes inspects the work performed by these contractors.
The contractors are required to correct any errors or defects in their work. (Transcript at
pages 40, 43, 53, 92.)
When Pinnacle was incorporated in October 2002, it was advised by an insurance
agent that it could exclude its corporate officers from the status of employees for workers'
compensation purposes. Then, according to the agent, Pinnacle would have no employees
and would not be obligated to purchase workers' compensation insurance.2 (Transcript at 97.)
Mr. Liljenquist, Pinnacle's vice president of administration, "told [the agent] that we
wanted to opt out" of workers' compensation coverage. (Liljenquist's testimony on this point
is attached as Appendix D; transcript at 97.) Pinnacle filed "applications" and obtained
liability insurance, but not workers' compensation insurance. (Transcript at 98.)
During April, 2003, Pinnacle began contracting with Platinum to roof several houses,
including a house Pinnacle was building in Saratoga Springs, Utah. (Transcript at 78, 82.)
Mel Beagley, Platinum's owner, advised Pinnacle that Platinum had "opted out" of carrying
workers' compensation insurance. (Transcript at 76, 79.) Platinum assigned Mr. Ebmeyer,
who had been employed by Platinum since January 2003, to do the work on the Saratoga
Springs house. (Transcript at 21, 31.) On August 11, 2003, as Mr. Ebmeyer was completing

2
Section 34A-2-201 imposes an obligation on all employers to obtain workers'
compensation coverage by obtaining insurance or qualifying as a self-insurer.
5

the roof, he fell from the roofs ridgeline to the ground. (Transcript at 32.) As a result of this
fall, he fractured both heels, his right elbow and right wrist. (Record volume 2 at 23.)
Mr. Ebmeyer filed applications for hearing with the Labor Commission to compel
Pinnacle and Platinum to pay workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. (Record at 1,
65.) Because neither Pinnacle nor Platinum had workers' compensation insurance coverage,
the Adjudication Division added the UEF as a respondent to Mr. Ebmeyer's claim. (Record
at 8.) Judge Sessions held a formal evidentiary hearing on Mr. Ebmeyer's claim. (See
hearing transcript.) Judge Sessions then awarded benefits to Mr. Ebmeyer and held Platinum
and Pinnacle jointly and severally liable for those benefits. Specifically, Judge Sessions held
Pinnacle liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" pursuant to § 103(7).

(Appendix B;

record at 143-149.)
Pinnacle filed a motion for Appeals Board review of Judge Sessions' decision. In this
motion for review, Pinnacle raised a number of objections to Judge Sessions' decision,
including the two issues now before this Court. (Record at 151-173.) The Appeals Board's
rejected Pinnacle's arguments and concluded that Judge Sessions had properly assessed
liability for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits against both Platinum and Pinnacle. (Appendix C; record
at 217-220.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is no disagreement as to the fundamental facts of this case. Pinnacle contracted
with Platinum to roof a "spec" house Pinnacle was building in Saratoga Springs.

In

performing that work, Platinum's employee, Mr. Ebmeyer, fell off the roof and suffered
compensable injuries.

As Mr. Ebmeyer's direct employer, Platinum is liable for Mr.

Ebmeyer's workers' compensation benefits. However, what is in dispute is whether Pinnacle
6

is also liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits as a "statutory employer" under § 34A-2-103(7)(a)
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. Section 103(7)(a)'s "statutory employer" provision
is as follows:
If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done . . . for the
employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or
control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the
employer, the contractor [and] all persons employed by the contractor . . . are
considered employees of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter

In applying the plain language of § 103(7) to the facts of this case, Judge Sessions and
the Appeals Board concluded that Pinnacle was subject to the provisions of § 103(7), and that
the nature of Pinnacle's relationship with Platinum rendered Pinnacle the "statutory
employer" of Mr. Ebmeyer.
Now, in appellate proceedings before this Court, Pinnacle challenges the Appeals
Board's decisions on two grounds.
First, Pinnacle points out that the "statutory employer" provision of § 103(7)(a)
applies only to those entities that are already "employers." Pinnacle argues it cannot be
considered an "employer" because the company's only potential employees—its three
corporate officers—were excluded as employees pursuant to §34A-2-104(4) of the Act.
The flaw with this argument is that Pinnacle failed to comply with § 104(4)'s
requirements for excluding corporate officers as employees.

Strict compliance with §

104(4)'s exclusion provisions is required. Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co., 956
P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1998). In short, because Pinnacle failed to comply with § 104(4),
Pinnacle remained an "employer" and, as such, remained subject to § 103(7)'s "statutory
employer" provisions.
7

Pinnacle's second argument is that, even if Pinnacle is generally subject to § 103(7)'s
"statutory employer" provision, Pinnacle did not "retain supervision or control" over
Platinum's work and, therefore, does not meet § 103(7)'s definition of a statutory employer.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[t]he power to supervise or control the
ultimate performance of subcontractors satisfies the requirement that the general contractor
retain supervision or control over the subcontractor." Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726
P.2d 427, 432 (Utah 1986.) The record in this case establishes that Pinnacle actually
exercised the right to inspect and require correction of Platinum's roofing work, thereby
satisfying § 103(7)'s "supervision or control" test.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: BECAUSE PINNACLE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH §
104(4)'S REQUIREMENTS FOR EXCLUDING CORPORATE
OFFICERS AS EMPLOYEES, PINNACLE REMAINED SUBJECT TO
§ 103(7)'S "STATUTORY EMPLOYER" PROVISIONS.
In simplest terms, Pinnacle argues it cannot be Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer"
under § 103(7) because that provision applies only to "employers." And, according to
Pinnacle, it is not an "employer" because it has excluded its only employees—its corporate
officers—from the status of employees pursuant to § 104(4) of the Act.
The "statutory employer" provision found in § 103(7) begins with the following
condition (emphasis added): "If any person who is an employer procures any work to be
done . . . for the employer by a contractor

" Thus, because the plain language of § 103(7)

limits its application to employers, it is necessary to determine whether Pinnacle is an
"employer" within the meaning of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.

8

Section 34A-2-103(2) of the Act defines "employer" as ". . . each person . . . who
regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in the same business . . . under any
contract of hire . . . ." More to the point, § 34A-2-104(4)(c) of the Act explicitly states that
"[a] director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee . . . until the notice
described in [§ 104(4)(b)]is given." Thus, under these statutory provisions, Pinnacle's
corporate officers must be considered Pinnacle's employees until such time as Pinnacle
complies with § 104(4)(b)'s notice requirement. By logical extension, if the corporate
officers are Pinnacle's employees, then Pinnacle is an employer.
Whether Pinnacle complied with § 104(4)(b)'s notice requirement so as to exclude its
officers as employees requires consideration of 1) what Pinnacle actually did to comply with
§ 104(4)(b) and 2) the legal effect of Pinnacle's actions. Each of these points is discussed
below.
A, The Appeals Board Correctly Found That Pinnacle Did Not Submit The Required
Written Notice Of Exclusion.
The Appeals Board found that Pinnacle's officers remained employees because
Pinnacle did not submit the written notice required by § 104(4)(b). (Appendix C; record at
218.) In its argument to this Court, Pinnacle contends it did submit the required notice.
(Pinnacle's brief beginning at 12.) Pinnacle's challenge to the Appeals Board's finding of
fact should be rejected because substantial evidence supports the Appeals Board's
determination.
Pinnacle attempts to show its compliance with § 104(4)(b) by citing testimony of Brad
Liljenquist, one of Pinnacle's owners and its vice president of administration. (Appendix D;
transcript at 96, 97.) Pinnacle summarizes Mr. Liljenquist's testimony as establishing that
9

Pinnacle "provided written notification to the insurance agent that it did not have any
employees and subsequently opted out of workers' compensation coverage." (Pinnacle brief
at 13.) But that was not Mr. Liljenquist's testimony. Rather, Mr. Liljenquist testified that
Pinnacle filed some sort of "applications" with Pinnacle's insurance agent and that he "told"
the agent that Pinnacle had no employees and "wanted to opt out" of workers' compensation
coverage.
On its face, Mr. Liljenquist's brief and ambiguous testimony does not establish that
Pinnacle complied with § 104(4)(b)'s objective requirements for notice. In particular, §
104(4) requires: 1) a written notice 2) naming the persons to be excluded3) that is served 4)
on the insurance carrier.3 Mr. Liljenquist's testimony merely indicates that he discussed
excluding Pinnacle's officers with Pinnacle's insurance agent. Pinnacle's counsel did not ask
questions to adduce any additional information.

(Appendix D; transcript at 96, 97.)

Furthermore, Pinnacle failed to produce either the original or a copy of the written notice
required by § 104(4).
After considering the foregoing evidence, with its ambiguities, gaps and omissions,
the Appeals Board concluded that Pinnacle had failed to prove it actually submitted written
notice of its intent to exclude corporate officers. In light of the record that was before the
Appeals Board, the Board's finding of fact on this point is supported by the evidence and
should be upheld by this Court.

3 As the Appeals Board noted in its decision, "[i]n the context of §104(4)(b) specifically and
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act generally, this reference to "insurance carrier" must be
understood as referring to the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier, and not
to a provider of some type of unrelated insurance coverage." (Record at 219; Exhibit C, page
3.) Pinnacle has not challenged the Appeals Board's conclusion on this point.
10

B. The Appeals Board Correctly Applied § 104(4)(b).
Pinnacle contends that its efforts to opt out of workers' compensation coverage were
"enough to comply with Section 104(4) and enough to remove Pinnacle Homes from an
'employer' status in this case." (Pinnacle brief at 13.) The Commission understands this
argument as a challenge to the Appeals Board's application of § 104(4) to the facts of this
case. In order for Pinnacle to prevail on such an argument, this Court must conclude that the
Appeals Board's application of the statute "exceed(s) the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality" so as to constitute an abuse of discretion under §63-46b-16(h)(i) of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act. Osman v. Industrial Commission, 948 P.2d 242.
Admittedly, the Appeals Board held Pinnacle to strict compliance with § 104(4)(b).
In doing so, the Appeals Board followed the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Olsen v.
Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998). There, the Supreme Court concluded
that an earlier version of § 104(4) was unambiguous and should be applied according to its
plain language. Olsen at 259.
Pinnacle attempts to distinguish its situation from that in Olsen on the basis that
Pinnacle has no employees except its officers, while the corporate employer in Olsen had
other employees who remained subject to workers' compensation coverage. Nothing in the
Olsen decision supports this version of the facts in Olsen. But more importantly, the Supreme
Court's decision in Olsen does not turn on such assumed facts. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court observed that workers' compensation statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of
employee coverage. The Court then stated: "Allowing exclusion of a director from coverage
on the basis of constructive notice would be to construe the Workers' Compensation Act
liberally against coverage. This we will not do." Olsen at 260.
11

Pinnacle also argues that a literal application of § 104(4)(b) leads to the unreasonable
result that a corporation must always obtain worker's compensation insurance, even if the
corporation's only employees are corporate officers who can then be excluded from coverage.
Pinnacle's argument implies that such a result could not have been intended by the
Legislature.

However, in 1996, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 135, "Workers'

Compensation Coverage," (Session Laws 1996, Chapter 190), which added subsection (8) to
§31A-21-104 of the Utah Insurance Code, as follows:
Notwithstanding Subsection (1) [requiring an "insurable interest"] an insurer
. . . may issue a workers' compensation policy to a . . . corporation . . . that
elects not to include any . . . corporate officer as an employee under the policy
even if at the time the policy is issued the . . . corporation, . . has no
employees.
Section §31A-21-104(8) indicates that the Legislature was aware that corporations
require workers' compensation coverage even when corporate officers have been excluded as
employees and the corporation had no other employees. Section 31A-21-104(8), § 104(4) and
§ 103(7) dovetail to insure that the corporate form of organization is not used to shield
corporations from their responsibilities to provide coverage and pay benefits under the
workers' compensation system.
In summary, the Appeals Board's finding that Pinnacle did not submit the written
notice required by § 104(4)(b) is supported by substantial evidence. The Appeals Board
application of § 104(4)(4) is consistent with the statute's plain language and appellate
precedent.

This Court should therefore affirm the Appeals Board's determination that

Pinnacle is an employer within the meaning of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act and, as
such, is subject to §103(7)'s "statutory employer" provision.

12

POINT TWO: PINNACLE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PLATINUM
SATISFIES
§
103(7)'S
"SUPERVISION
OR
CONTROL"
REQUIREMENT.
Pinnacle's second argument is that "[t]he Labor Commission erred in finding that
Pinnacle Homes had any supervision or control over Platinum Builders that warrants a
finding that Mr. Ebmeyer was Pinnacle Homes' employee." In considering this mixed
question of law and fact, this Court will uphold the Appeals Board's application of the statute
unless it "exceed(s) the bounds of reasonableness and rationality" so as to constitute an abuse
of discretion under §63-46b-16(h)(i) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Osman v.
Industrial Commission, 948 P.2d 242.
As material to Pinnacle's argument, § 103(7)(a) provides that "[i]f any . . . employer
procures any work to be done . . . by a contractor over whose work the employer retains
supervision or control, . . . all persons employed by the contractor . . . are considered
employees of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter . . . ."4 As with all
statutory provisions, § 103(7) must be applied, if possible, according to its plain language.
Point One of this brief has already discussed the basis for concluding that Pinnacle is
an "employer" and, therefore, subject to §103(7). As to the proper understanding and
application of § 103(7)'s phrase "supervision or control," the Utah Supreme Court's
discussion in Bennett, 726 P.2d at 432 is controlling: "[T]he term 'supervision or control'
requires only that the general contractor retain ultimate control over the project." The
Supreme Court also observed that "[t]he power to supervise or control the ultimate

4 The Commission notes that § 103(7) includes other requirements and also treats other
individuals as employees of the statutory employer. The Commission has omitted these other
provisions from § 103(7) in order to clarify the statute's language with respect to Pinnacle's
"supervision and control" argument.
13

performance of subcontractors satisfies the requirement that the general contractor retain
supervision or control over the subcontractor. [Citations omitted.] Therefore, as long as a
subcontractor's work is a part or process of the general contractor's business, an inference
arises that the general contractor has retained supervision or control over the subcontractor .
. . ." Bennett, Ibid.
In Bennett, it was a general contractor's status as a statutory employer that was under
consideration. The Supreme Court therefore discussed § 103(7) in terms of the relationship
between the general contractor, subcontractor, and the subcontractor's direct employee. In
the case now before this Court, there is no general contractor. Rather, Pinnacle, the owner of
the construction project, entered into a direct contractual relationship with Platinum, the
roofing contractor. But this distinction makes no difference. Section §103(7) looks to the
relationship between the "employer" (Pinnacle in this case) and the contractor (Platinum).
Thus, Pinnacle is properly considered the "statutory employer" of Platinum's employees,
including Mr. Ebmeyer, if Pinnacle retained the power to supervise Platinum's ultimate
performance as discussed in Bennett.
There is no dispute that Platinum's business was the construction of homes for sale
and that the roofing that Platinum did for Pinnacle was a "part or process" of that business.
Consequently, under Bennett, the inference arises that Pinnacle retained supervision or
control over Platinum.

But beyond this inference, the record affirmatively establishes

Pinnacle's supervision and control over Platinum. Specifically, Pinnacle reserved the right to
inspect Platinum's work and to require correction of errors or defects. (Transcript at pages
40, 43, 53, 92.)

Under these circumstances, Judge Sessions and the Appeals Board

reasonably concluded that Pinnacle was Mr. Ebmeyer's statutory employer.
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As a final observation, the "statutory employer" provision found in §103(7) serves an
important function in Utah's workers' compensation system. This important function was
discussed by the Supreme Court in Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d at 431:
According to Professor Larson, statutes of this kind were passed "to protect
employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate
liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it within
his power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsibility and
insist upon appropriate compensation protection for their workers." A
secondary purpose of these statutes "was to forestall evasion of [workmen's
compensation acts] by those who might be tempted to subdivide their regular
operations among subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment relations
with the workers . . . " (Citations in original omitted.)
The dangers referenced in Bennett are all present in this case. Pinnacle tried to avoid
workers' compensation responsibility by "subdividing [its] regular operations among
subcontractors." And, in doing so, Pinnacle selected Platinum,

an "irresponsible and

uninsured subcontractor." Then, when Mr. Ebmeyer actually suffered serious injuries while
working on Pinnacle's project, Pinnacle sought to shift the cost of those injuries from its own
commercial enterprise and, through the UEF, to the responsible Utah employers who
maintain workers' compensation coverage and who finance the UEF through premium
assessments. Such a result would be contrary to the plain language of § 104(7) and the
underlying policy of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Appeals Board correctly held Pinnacle to strict compliance with §
104(4)'s "written notice" requirement. Pinnacle's failure to provide such written notice of its
intention to exclude its officers as employees resulted in Pinnacle remaining subject to §
104(7)'s statutory employer provision. The Appeals Board also reasonably concluded that
the relationship between Pinnacle and Platinum satisfied § 103(7)'s requirement of
15

"supervision or control" so as to render Pinnacle liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's workers'
compensation benefits as his "statutory employer." Therefore, the Utah Labor Commission
respectfully asks this Court to affirm the Appeals Board's.
Dated this 13th day of April, 2007.

Alan Hennebold
General Counsel
Utah Labor Commission

16

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on the 13 1 day of April, 2007, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent, Utah Labor Commission, were mailed by U S Mail, postage
prepaid to the following:
Timothy C. Allen
350 South 400 East #113
Salt Lake City UT84111
Theodore E Kanell
Plant Christensen & Kanell
136 East South Temple Ste 1700
Salt Lake City UT84111
Sharon J. Eblen
Blackburn & Stoll
257 East 200 South #800
Salt Lake City UT84111

ALU^oq

17

Appendix A

34A-2-103, Employers enumerated and defined — Regularly employed —
Statutory employers,
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the state are
considered employers under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act prescribed in Sections 34A-2-105 and 34A-3-102, the state is
considered to be a single employer and includes any office, department, agency,
authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, or other
instrumentality of the state.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, including each public utility
and each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more workers or
operatives in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, is considered an employer under this chapter
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(b) As used in this Subsection (2):
(i) "Independent contractor11 means any person engaged in the performance of any
work for another who, while so engaged, is:
(A) independent of the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work;
(B) not subject to the routine rule or control of the employer;
(C) engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of work; and
(D) subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the
employer's design.
(ii) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the trade, business,
profession, or occupation of the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or for
only a portion of the year.
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrangement under Title 58,
Chapter 59, Professional Employer Organization Registration Act, is considered the
employer of leased employees and shall secure workers' compensation benefits for them
by complying with Subsection 34A-2-201(l) or (2) and commission rules.
(b) An insurance carrier may underwrite workers' compensation secured in accordance
with Subsection (3)(a) showing the leasing company as the named insured and each client
company as an additional insured by means of individual endorsements.
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the division as directed by commission rule.
(d) The division shall promptly inform the Division of Occupation and Professional
Licensing within the Department of Commerce if the division has reason to believe that
an employee leasing company is not in compliance with Subsection 34A-2-201(l) or (2)
and commission rules.
(4) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee or more than one
employee at least 40 hours per week is not considered an employer under this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(5) (a) As used in this Subsection (5):
(i) (A) "agricultural employer" means a person who employs agricultural labor as
defined in Subsections 35A-4-206(l) and (2) and does not include employment as
provided in Subsection 35A-4-206(3); and
(B) notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a)(i)(A), only for purposes of determining who is
a member of the employer's immediate family under Subsection (5)(a)(ii), if the

(a) this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and
(b) the rules of the commission.
(7) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in
part for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision
or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, the
contractor, all persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors under the
contractor, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are considered
employees of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing, or remodelling a
residence that the person owns or is in the process of acquiring as the person's personal
residence may not be considered an employee or employer solely by operation of
Subsection (7)(a).
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship is not considered an
employee under Subsection (7)(a) if the employer who procures work to be done by the
partnership or sole proprietorship obtains and relies on either:
(i) a valid certification of the partnership's or sole proprietorship's compliance with
Section 34A-2-201 indicating that the partnership or sole proprietorship secured the
payment of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Section 34A-2-201; or
(ii) if a partnership or sole proprietorship with no employees other than a partner of
the partnership or owner of the sole proprietorship, a workers' compensation policy
issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 31A-21-104(8) stating that:
(A) the partnership or sole proprietorship is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business; and
(B) the partner or owner personally waives the partner's or owner's entitlement to the
benefits of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, in the operation of
the partnership or sole proprietorship.
(d) A director or officer of a corporation is not considered an employee under
Subsection (7)(a) if the director or officer is excluded from coverage under Subsection
34A-2-104(4).
(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of the employer under Subsection
(7)(a), if the employer who procures work to be done by the contractor or subcontractor
obtains and relies on either:
(i) a valid certification of the contractor's or subcontractor's compliance with Section
34A-2-201; or
(ii) if a partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship with no employees other than a
partner of the partnership, officer of the corporation, or owner of the sole proprietorship,
a workers' compensation policy issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 31A-21104(8) stating that:
(A) the partnership, corporation, or sole proprietorship is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business; and
(B) the partner, corporate officer, or owner personally waives the partner's, corporate
officer's, or owner's entitlement to the benefits of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act, in the operation of the partnership's, corporation's, or sole
proprietorship's enterprise under a contract of hire for services.
(f) (i) For purposes of this Subsection (7)(f), "eligible employer" means a person who:

34A-2-104. "Employee," "worker," and "operative" defined — Mining lessees
and sublessees — Corporate officers and directors — Real estate agents and brokers - Prison inmates — Insurance producers — Certain domestic workers.
(1) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, employee,"
"worker," and "operative" mean:
(a) (i) each elective and appointive officer and any other person:
(A) in the service of:
(I) the state;
(II) a county, city, or town within the state; or
(III) a school district within the state;
(B) serving the state, or any county, city, town, or school district under:
(1) an election;
(II) appointment; or
(III) any contract of hire, express or implied, written or oral; and
(ii) including:
(A) an officer or employee of the state institutions of learning; and
(B) a member of the National Guard while on state active duty; and
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section 34A-2-103, who
employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about
the same establishment:
(i) under any contract of hire:
(A) express or implied; and
(B) oral or written;
(ii) including aliens and minors, whether legally or illegally working for hire; and
(iii) not including any person whose employment:
(A) is casual; and
(B) not in the usual course of the trade, business, or occupation of the employee's
employer.
(2) (a) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter and
Chapter 3, any lessee in mines or of mining property and each employee and sublessee of
the lessee shall be:
(i) covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter and Chapter 3;
(ii) subject to this chapter and Chapter 3; and
(iii) entitled to the benefits of this chapter and Chapter 3, to the same extent as if the
lessee, employee, or sublessee were employees of the lessor drawing the wages paid
employees for substantially similar work.
(b) The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an amount
equal to the insurance premium for that type of work.
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include any partner of the
partnership or owner of the sole proprietorship as an employee of the partnership or sole
proprietorship under this chapter and Chapter 3.
(b) If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes an election under Subsection (3)(a),
the partnership or sole proprietorship shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier
naming the persons to be covered.
(c) A partner of a partnership or owner of a sole proprietorship may not be considered
an employee of the partner's partnership or the owner's sole proprietorship under this

individual that the individual is not an employee under this chapter or Chapter 3.
(6) An individual described in Subsection (5)(d) may become an employee under this
chapter and Chapter 3 if the employer of the individual complies with:
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3; and
(b) commission rules.
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
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GLENMEBMEYER,
Petitioner,
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.
PLATINUM BUILDERS/MEL BEAGLEY
and/or UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND;
PINNACLE HOMES INC and/or
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,
Respondents.

Case No. 2003919
Judge Dale W Sessions

THIS MATTER came before the Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, on August 30,2004 at 11:29 AM. The hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of
the Commission. The Honorable Dale W Sessions, Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter
"ALJ") presided. The petitioner, Glen M Ebmeyer, was present and represented by his/her
attorney Timothy Allen Esq. The Respondents Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley, was not present
; and Pinnacle Homes Inc, and Uninsured Employers Fund were represented by attorney
Theodore Kanell Esq, and Elliot R Lawrence Esq.
Having failed to appear to defend the action following appropriate notice, default was
entered on the record against Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley.
THE ALJ having in mind the testimony and other evidence before it, now enters
FINDINGS OF FACT
in this matter as follows:
Petitioner was injured while he was working for Respondents Pinnacle Homes,
Inc., Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley on August 11, 2003.
Petitioner was acting in the scope and course of his employment at the time he
was injured. He was roofing a home when a gust of wind swept him off of the
roof.
The nature of Petitioner's injuries include injury to both heels, wrist and elbow of
the right hand/arm.
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5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

At the time of injury, Petitioner was earning $ 15-$ 18 per hour working
approximately 40 hours per week, with an average weekly rate of $500.00. His
compensation rate is $334.00 per week.
At the time of the injury, Petitioner was not married and had no dependent
children.
Petitioner remained off work from the date of his injury to the present time. He
claims temporary total disability for the maximum allowed period of time, to wit
312 weeks.
Petitioner has not yet reached stability or maximum medical improvement for his
injuries. His disability has not yet been rated.
Respondent is a statutory employer within the meaning of Utah Code Ann., §34A2-103. Stated another way, because Petitioner was an employee of the subcontractor, he is a statutory employee of the general contractor in this instance.
Respondents hired Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley to work for them on
homes which they built to sell. The homes were not private residences of any
principle of the Respondent Pinnacle Homes, Inc., but were built for the purpose
of selling the completed homes for profit.
Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley was contracted to put a roof on a house in
Saratoga Springs. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was the general contractor. They subcontract to Platinum Home Builders.
Petitioner was an employee of Platinum Builders and thereby a statutory
employee of Pinnacle Homes, Inc.
The Corporation of Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was established in 2002. The
principles of the corporation have opted out of workers compensation coverage
for themselves. This they are permitted to do under the law. However, they
cannot escape the purposes and intent of the legislature in requiring that
employees be covered for the injuries that they receive as a direct result of their
employment.
Pinnacle Homes, Inc., retained indirect control over the Petitioner. They alone
decided who to hire as a sub-contractor on the specific homes within their
business plan. Whether they exercised direct control over who the sub-contractor
would hire is another matter.
There is insufficient evidence to determine whether Platinum Builders and/or Mel
Beagley is solvent or not. Therefore, the Uninsured Employers Fund faces the
obligation to pay whatever Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley fails to pay, with
their right to proceed in contribution from Platinum Homes and/or Mel Beagley
intact. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is solvent, is an ongoing business and optimistic
about the future of their business enterprise.
Mr. Ebmeyer testified that he did not sign the Master Service Agreement. His
testimony is credible on that issue. His signature is not the same as on other
documents in the Commission file including the Application for Hearing.
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18.
19.
20.
21.

Further, it appears that someone attempted the signature on the wrong line, and
then re-created the signature below the false start attempt at the signature
Petitioner was able to work alone with Mel Beagley coming occasionally to see
him at a job site. On occasion, a truck belonging to Pinnacle Homes, Inc., would
drive through the area. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., was the owner of the house
Petitioner was working on at the time he was injured.
Pinnacle Homes, Inc., truck containing a person presumably from that company
arrived once to ask if Petitioner was going to be fixing another home nearby. It is
clear that Pinnacle Homes, Inc., had an expectation that Petitioner would be
working on another project.
Petitioner worked on 6 different homes belonging to Pinnacle Homes, Inc.
Petitioner has not obtained an impairment rating and an opinion about
stabilization because he cannot afford it.
Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is an ongoing and profitable business, presumable capable
of paying some or all of the benefits awarded to Petitioner.
Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley is/are still in business, presumably in a
profitable status and capable of paying some or all benefits awarded to Petitioner.

The ALJ having first entered findings of fact, now enters
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
in this matter as follows:
22. Each person in the service of any employer who employs one or more workers or
operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, is an employee.
Utah Code Ann §34A-2-104(l)(b). An operative is includes those persons that
bring about the employers desired effect.
23. In this case, Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley was an operative of Pinnacle
Homes, Inc. Testimony showed that it was a course and design of Pinnacle
Homes Inc., to sub-contract work for their business enterprise. Petitioner worked
on approximately 6 different homes for Pinnacle Homes, Inc. It appears that they
may be seeking to avoid paying taxes, benefits and for maintaining workers
compensation insurance on direct employees, so they use operatives instead.
24. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is liable for the costs of injury because they are a statutory
employer within the meaning of Utah Code Ann., §35-1-42(2) which states:
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for
him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control,
and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer,
such contractor, all persons employed by him, all subcontractors under
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him, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are
considered employees of the original employer.
25. Quoting in depth from Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah
1986): According to Professor Larson, statutes of this kind were passed "to
protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing
ultimate liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it
within his power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsibility and
insist upon appropriate compensation protection for their workers." Larson, supra,
§ 49.14. A secondary purpose of these statutes was "to forestall evasion of
[workmen's compensation acts] by those who might be tempted to subdivide their
regular operations among subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment
relations with the workers
" Id. § 49.15.
Under § 35-1-42(2), a subcontractor's employee is deemed an employee of
the general contractor if (1) the general contractor retains some supervision or
control over the subcontractor's work, and (2) the work done by the subcontractor
is a "part or process in the trade or business of the employer." E.g., Pinter
Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 307 (Utah 1984); Rustler Lodge v.
Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d at 228-29; Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v.
Ashton, 538 P.2d at 318 (1975).
A subcontractor's work is "part or process in the trade or business of the
employer," if it is part of the operations which directly relate to the successful
performance of the general contractor's commercial enterprise. Pinter
Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 309; Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d
1128, 1131 (Utah 1977); King v. Palmer, 129 Conn. 636, 640-41, 30 A.2d 549,
552 (1943). The trade or business of a general contractor in the construction
business is construction, Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994, 996 (1972);
Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 289, 508 P.2d 805, 807
(1973); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1214,1223 (1944), and any portion of the general
contractor's construction project which is subcontracted out will ordinarily be
considered "part or process in the trade or business o f the general contractor.
The requirement in § 35-1-42(2) that the general contractor, as a "statutory
employer," retain "supervision or control" over the work of the subcontractor who
hired the "statutory employee" cannot, by {726 P.2d 432} definition, be equated
with the common law standard for determining whether a person is an employee
or an independent contractor. In dealing with "statutory" employees, the statute
begins with the proposition that the claimant qualifies as an employee of the
subcontractor. But the statutory requirement that the general contractor have
"supervision or control" over the work of the subcontractor cannot mean that the
subcontractor must also qualify as an employee of the general contractor. That
would be at least highly improbable and perhaps impossible by definition. Rather,
the term "supervision or control" requires only that the general contractor retain
ultimate control over the project. Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at
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309. As stated mNochta v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz. App. 166, 436 P.2d
944(1968),
Although the construction process requires the general contractor to
delegate to a greater or lesser degree to subcontractors, the general contractor
remains responsible for successful completion of the entire project and of
necessity retains the right to require that subcontractors perform according to
specifications. The power to supervise or control the ultimate performance of
subcontractors satisfies the requirement that the general contractor retain
supervision or control over the subcontractor. See Pinter Construction Co. v.
Frisby, supra, 678 P.2d at 309. See generally Tanner Companies v. Superior
Court, 144 Ariz. 141,146, 696 P.2d 693,698 (1985) (Feldman, J., dissenting).
Therefore, as long as a subcontractor's work is a part or process of the general
contractor's business, an inference arises that the general contractor has retained
supervision or control over the subcontractor sufficient to meet the requirement of
§ 35-1-42(2). See Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 316, 172
P.2d 136,140(1946).
Finally, we note that the remedial purpose of the Workmen's
Compensation Act supports the conclusion that § 35-1-42(2) should be construed
in favor of protecting the employee. E.g., Pinter Construction, 678 P.2d at 307;
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d at 225, 364 P.2d at
1022 (1961); Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185,187-88, 290 P.2d
692, 693-94 (1955). The Arizona Supreme Court, in construing an almost
identical statutory provision, has stated that it "is a legislatively created scheme by
which conceded nonemployees are deliberately brought within the coverage of the
[Workmen's Compensation] Act." Young v. Environmental Air Products, Inc., 136
Ariz. 158, 161, 665 P.2d 40, 43 (1983). Accord Larson, supra, § 49.00. Wisconsin
has also recognized the broad scope of its similar statute:
The entire statutory scheme indicates a desire on the part of the legislature
to extend the protection of these laws to those who might not be deemed
employees {726 P.2d 433} under the legal concepts governing the liability of a
master for the tortious acts of his servant. Price County Telephone Co. v. Lord,
47 Wis. 2d 704, 715-16,177 N.W.2d 904, 910 (1970) (footnote omitted).
26. In sum, it is well established that when an employer has retained the right to
control the work of a worker's compensation claimant (such as select the subcontractor in the first place) the claimant is the employer's employee for workers
compensation purposes. In determining whether the employee has retained the
right of control the factors to consider include: the right to direct performance of
the work, the right to hire and fire, responsibility for payment of wages and
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providing necessary equipment. But these factors are not inclusive and one factor
is completely controlling. Johnson Brothers Construction v. Labor Commission,
967 P.2d 1258,1260 (Utah App. 1998). Ultimately it is the right to control that is
determinative. "It is not the actual exercise of control that determines whether an
employer-employee relationship exists; it is the right to control that is
determinative." Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246,249 (Utah 1995).
27. Pinnacle Homes, Inc., is the employer of Petitioner in this instance and should be
liable for the injuries to Petitioner.
THE ALJ having first entered findings of fact and conclusions of law now enters the
ORDER
of the Labor Commission as follows:
28. Respondent Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley is hereby defaulted.
29. Respondents Platinum Builders and/or Mel Beagley and Pinnacle Homes, Inc., are
jointly and severally liable for the injuries, lost wages and medical costs of
Petitioner as his employees).
30. Jurisdiction over the Uninsured Employers Fund of Utah is reserved.
31. Petitioner is awarded temporary total disability payments of $334.00 per week
from August 11,2003 until he is medically stable not to exceed 312 weeks. This
amount is computed using $500 per week average weekly wage as stipulated at
hearing.
32. Petitioner is awarded compensation that includes payment of his medical bills that
are reasonably related to his industrial injury.
33. Petitioner is awarded 8% interest on payments due him in this order from the time
they are accrued and/or due until paid in full.
34. Petitioner's attorney, Timothy Allen, Esq., is awarded attorney fees established by
the rules and sliding scale of the Labor Commission for meaningful services in this
case. His fee is to be paid directly out of the award to Petitioner and paid to him
directly. Likewise as each payment becomes due, a separate check will be sent to
Mr. Allen for his fee.
DATED March 24,2005.

le WjSpssions
AdministtSrve Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
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A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on March 24,2005, to the persons/parties at
the following addresses:
Glen M Ebmeyer
330 N 800 W Apt 2
Salt Lake City UT 84116
Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley
Box 1384
RivertonUT 84065
Pinnacle Homes Inc
479 W 300 N
American Fork UT 84003
Uninsured Employers Fund
160E300S3rdFl
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Timothy Allen Esq
350 S 400 E N 113
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Theodore Kanell Esq
136 E S Temple Ste 1700
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Salt Lake City UT 84111
Barry N Johnson Esq
3865 S Wasatch Blvd Ste 300
Salt Lake City UT 84109
Elliot R Lawrence Esq
160E200S3rdFl
Salt Lake City UT 84114
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

GLEN M. EBMEYER,
Petitioner,
ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

vs.
PLATINUM BUILDERS, INC.,
PINNACLE HOMES, INC., and
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,

Case No. 03-0919

Respondents.

Pinnacle Homes, Inc. asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review
Administrative Law Judge Sessions' determination that Pinnacle shares liability with Platinum
Builders, Inc. for Glen M. Ebmeyer's medical and disability benefits under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
While working as a roofer for Platinum Builders, Inc.1 on August 11,2003, Mr. Ebmeyer fell
and suffered serious injuries. On September 19,2003, Mr. Ebmeyer filed an application to compel
Platinum to pay workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. On June 23, 2004, Mr. Ebmeyer
added Pinnacle Homes, Inc. as a respondent in its capacity as the owner and builder of the house
where the accident occurred. Mr. Ebmeyer also added the Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF") as a
respondent because neither Platinum nor Pinnacle carried workers' compensation insurance.2
Judge Sessions held an evidentiary hearing in this matter on August 24,2004. On March 24,
2005, he awarded benefits to Mr. Ebmeyer and held Platinum and Pinnacle jointly and severally
liable for those benefits. Platinum was held liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's direct employer. Pinnacle was
held liable as Mr. Ebmeyer's "statutory employer" pursuant to §34A-2-103(7) of the Act.

i Judge Sessions' decision refers to "Platinum Builders/Mel Beagley." However, the record
indicates that Platinum Builders was a Utah corporation in good standing at the time of Mr.
Ebmeyer's work injury and that Mel Beagley was the corporation's owner. Under these facts, Mr.
Ebmeyer's claim is against the corporation, rather than against Mr. Beagley as an individual.
2 Pursuant to §34A-2-704 of the Act, the UEF assists in paying benefits to injured workers whose
employers are insolvent, in receivership, or are otherwise unable to pay benefits.
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In requesting review of Judge Sessions' decision, Pinnacle argues it does not meet § 34A-2103(7)'s definition of a statutory employer. Pinnacle also argues that, even if it is Mr. Ebmeyer's
statutory employer, Platinum remains primarily liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits and Pinnacle is
only secondarily liable for those benefits.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Appeals Board finds the following facts material to Pinnacle's motion for review. The
Appeals Board also adopts Judge Sessions' findings of fact to the extent they are consistent with this
decision.
Pinnacle is a Utah corporation in the business of building and then selling new residential
houses. The corporation consists of three individuals who are its officers and owners. Apart from
these three officers, Pinnacle has no employees. It contracts with other companies and contractors to
do the actual work necessary to build its houses.
At the time Pinnacle started doing business, its insurance agent advised the company that it
could exclude its officers/owners from workers' compensation coverage, in which case the company
would have no employees and would not require workers' compensation insurance. Based on this
advice, Pinnacle did not purchase workers' compensation insurance. However, Pinnacle did not
submit written notice to its insurance carrier of its intent to exclude corporate officers from workers'
compensation coverage.
Platinum, also a Utah corporation at the time of Mr. Ebmeyer's accident, was in the business
of installing roofs on houses. Pinnacle engaged Platinum to do the roofing on several houses
Pinnacle was building in Saratoga Springs. Platinum in turn hired Mr. Ebmeyer to work as a roofer
on one of those houses. Platinum did not purchase workers' compensation insurance.
On August 11,2003, Mr. Ebmeyer was completing the roof of the house in question when he
accidentally fell and suffered the serious injuries. He now seeks workers' compensation benefits for
those injuries.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers to provide
workers' compensation benefits to employees injured in work-related accidents. None of the parties
challenge Judge Sessions' determination that Mr. Ebmeyer is entitled to workers' compensation
benefits for his injuries or Judge Sessions' determination that Platinum is liable for those benefits.
However, Pinnacle argues that Judge Sessions erred in concluded that Pinnacle is also liable for
those benefits as Mr. Ebmeyer's statutory employer under §103(7)(a) of the Act. The material
provisions of §103(7)(a) are as follows:
If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for
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the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or
control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, the
contractor [and] all persons employed by the contractor... are considered employees
of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter....
Pinnacle argues that because it had no employees, it was not an employer. Consequently, it
falls outside the scope of §103(7)(a), which is specifically limited to those entities who are
employers. The Appeals Board agrees that §103(7)(a) applies only to employers. Under the
circumstances of this case, Pinnacle's status as an employer depends on whether its corporate
officers are employees for purposes of the workers' compensation system.
Section 34A-2-103(2) of the Act defines "employer" as " . . . each person... who regularly
employs one or more workers or operatives in the same business... under any contract of hire — "
Section 104(4)(c) of the Act specifically provides that "[a] director or officer of a corporation is
considered an employee . . . until the notice described in Subsection (4)(b) is given."
The notice requirements of §104(4)(b) are as follows (emphasis added): "If a corporation
makes an election under Subsection (4)(a) [to exclude a corporate officer or director as an
employee], the corporation shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the
persons to be excluded from coverage."
Consequently, unless Pinnacle complied with the notice requirements of §104(4)(b), its
officers must be considered employees and Pinnacle must be considered an employer. Furthermore,
corporations must strictly comply with §104(4)(b)'s requirements for exclusion of officers and
directors from coverage. In Olsen v. Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.3d 257 (Utah 1998), the Utah
Supreme Court considered an earlier version of §104(4)(b). The Court stated:
This court construes workers' compensation statutes liberally in favor of
finding employee coverage. In Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah
1990), we stated, "It is the duty of the courts and the commission to construe the
Workers' Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage when
statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction."
Allowing exclusion of
a director from coverage on the basis of constructive notice would be to construe the
Workers' Compensation Act liberally against coverage. This we will not do. We
find that constructive notice is not a substitute for the written notice required by
section 35-l-43(3)(b).
In order to exclude its corporate officers as "employees," §104(4)(b) required Pinnacle to
serve its insurance carrier with a written notice naming the persons to be excluded. Pinnacle did not
3 In the context of § 104(4)(b) specifically and the Utah Workers' Compensation Act generally, this
reference to "insurance carrier" must be understood as referring to the employer's workers'
compensation insurance carrier, and not to a provider of some type of unrelated insurance coverage.
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provide such notice. Consequently, Pinnacle's officers remained employees and, for that reason,
Pinnacle remained an employer. As an employer, Pinnacle is subject to the statutory employer
provisions of §103(7) and is liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's workers' compensation benefits.
Pinnacle argues that even if it is Mr. Ebmeyer's statutory employer, its liability for his
benefits is secondary to Platinum's liability. Pinnacle's argument continues that Mr. Ebmeyer must
first seek his benefits from Platinum before he can compel Pinnacle to pay any benefits. Pinnacle
does not cite any authority for this argument, which runs contrary to the plain language of the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act. As already noted, both Platinum and Pinnacle are Mr. Ebmeyer's
employers and, as such, they are each liable for Mr. Ebmeyer's benefits. While it may be true that
Pinnacle may obtain reimbursement from Platinum for any benefits Pinnacle pays, Mr. Ebmeyer is
entitled to obtain payment from either or both of his two employers.
ORDER
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Board affirms Judge Sessions' decision and denies
Pinnacle's motion for review. It is so ordered.

CONCURRING OPINION
I concur in the result. However, I am disturbed by the majority's heavy reliance upon Section
34A-2-104(4). Pinnacle is a corporation whose only employees, within the meaning of § 104(4), are
directors and officers. By enacting this section, the Utah Legislature has clearly established the
public policy that certain limited, corporate employees may be exempt from workers' compensation
coverage. However, it is impossible for a corporation similarly situated as Pinnacle to comply with
the notice requirements of § 104(4)(b) because Pinnacle has no insurance carrier to notify, in writing,
of Pinnacle's desire to exempt its officers and directors from coverage and as "employees' under the
Act. The majority's decision possibly creates a strange option for corporations such as Pinnacle;
they could either send a written notification to any workers' compensation insurance carrier which
essentially says "thanks, we chose you as our insurance carrier, but we do not need workers'
compensation coverage because we are electing to exempt all our officers and directors, which are
our only employees, from coverage", or these corporations may have to resign themselves always to
being "employers" under §103(7)(a).
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Instead, I believe that facts in this case support the conclusion that Pinnacle acted as a general
contractor with sufficient supervisor control that the subcontractors became employees of Pinnacle
and Pinnacle is therefore an "employer" pursuant to §103(7)(a). Had Pinnacle desired to insulate
itself from workers' compensation liability under the Act, it could have retained an independent
general contractor which had appropriate workers' compensation insurance coverage.

JosJfm E. Hatch

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of Glen
M. Ebmeyer, Case No. 03-0919, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ^ffaay ofJ«ry720p6, to
the following:
duouM
Glen M. Ebmeyer
330 N 800 W Apt 12
Salt Lake City UT 84116
Platinum Builders
Box 1384
RivertonUT 84065
Pinnacle Homes Inc
479 W 300 N
American Fork UT 84003
Uninsured Employers Fund
160E300S3rdFl
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Timothy Allen, Esq.
350 S 400 E N 113
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Theodore Kanell, Esq.
136 E S Temple Ste 1700
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Barry N Johnson, Esq.
3865 S Wasatch Blvd Ste 300
Salt Lake City UT 84109

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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employees ?
A.

No .

Q.

Does Pinnacle Homes ever actually

do

any of the physical work on any of the homes

that

it owns?
A.

No .

Q.

Okay.

paid

How is it that you people

get

then?
A.

We take a draw against profits and — and

then have a reconciliation

at the end of the

year .
Q.

When you first organized

did you attempt to obtain all the

this b u s i n e s s ,
insurance

coverage that you needed?
A.

Y e s , I did.

Q.

How did you do

A.

I went to the office of our

agent, Wendy

that?

Dean M a r s h a l l , I believe

and told her what

insurance
is her n a m e ,

Pinnacle Homes Utah, Inc., was

going to do, told her about the

organizational

structure and asked her to provide us with
insurance
Q.

coverages that we needed.
Did she make any queries as to whether

or not Pinnacle Homes had any
A.

She

Ti

employees?

did.
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Q.

And what did you tell

A.

I told her that we did not
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her?
have

employees.
Q.

And did you file a p p l i c a t i o n s

as

such

with her ?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did she then tell you what type of

insurances you
A.

needed?

She did.

She~-she said that we would

need general liability
our--on a little office

i n s u r a n c e , insurance

on

space that we rent, and--

and she told us--on the workers

compensation,

she

said that since we were all owners of the
corporation that we would not--we would not be
required to purchase workers

compensation

i n s u r a n c e ; we could opt out of it.
Q.

And did you in fact opt out of it?

A.

I told Wendy that we wanted

Q.

Okay.

insurance

And so did you--did

for this

to opt o u t .
you

obtain

business?

A.

We did.

Q.

And once you received notice

that

this

application was filed, did you turn that over to
them?
A.

Yes.

T
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Q.

And what did they tell

A.

They told us that it was the

liability

you?
general

insurance that was submitted to, and

they told us that they — that we were not
under that policy
Q.

for workers

And why?

compensation.

Did they tell you why?

Because you didn't have any

employees?

A.

We didn't have any e m p l o y e e s .

Q.

Okay.

Now, when you make payments

Mr. Beagley, you heard the testimony
Mr. Lawrence about-~just
and making

covered

a payment.

to

of

about getting an

invoice

Is that how it works?

A.

That's how it w o r k s .

Q.

Okay.

Are you aware of anybody

in your

b u s i n e s s , you, Skip or Scott, who has ever had
any control or give any direction to Mr.

Beagley

about how work was to be done on any of these
homes ?
A.

Not that I'm

Q.

Okay.

aware of.

Now, the judge, you heard

him

question Mr. Lawrence about inspecting

these

things and, after the job is done, did

anybody

even inspect their
A.

Before

work?

I pay an invoice, I--if

is d o n e , I pay the

invoice.
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Do you leave the inspections

to the cities or their inspections
whatever
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they want to

of codes

up

and

inspect?

A.

Yes, uh-huh.

Q.

Okay.
MR. KANELL:

That's all the questions I

h a v e , Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Allen?

MR. ALLEN

No q u e s t i o n s , Your H o n o r .

THE COURT:

All right.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY-MR.LAWRENCE:
Q.

Mr. Lawrence--you'11

have to remind me

o f your n a m e .
A.

L i l j e n q u i s t , Brad.

Q.

M r . L i l j e n q u i s t , you probably heard

same line of questioning
regarding

the financial

that I gave M r .
status of your

Are you familiar and competent
current

financial

I be 1ieve so.

Q.

--of Pinnacle Homes?

company.

to testify on the

And I believe

earlier we were--I think the number

would

Lawrence

status--

A.

was floating

around.

forty

Is your company

thousand

solvent

it be capable of paying a claim of
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and

forty--
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